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In this paper, I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved
in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the
naturalist challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of
conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize twomodels that have been dominant
in thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models.
Both fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-
correction. I then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help
of the interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in
phenomenology and developmental psychology.
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INTRODUCTION
Conceptuality traditionally seems to impose speciﬁc challenges
to the possibility of a naturalistic account of mind. The issue I
address in this paper is how to specify the normative abilities that
are associated with conceptual competence in order to meet a
very popular challenge in recent developments of philosophy of
Mind, what I call the naturalist challenge (NC). I do not intend
to provide a complete or even general account of conceptuality
but, more modestly, I try to specify certain conditions that a natu-
ralistic account of conceptuality should accommodate, conditions
that deﬁne a framework of speciﬁc questions and concerns, in par-
ticular in relation of our capacities of conceptual self-correction,
that lead us, I argue, to prioritize a certain approach vis-à-vis
others: the interaction theory of mutual understanding. In the
context of that general approach, I claim it is possible to account
for self-correction in a way that is compatible with the challenge
at issue.
Addressing the problem of conceptual competence within a
naturalist framework makes it necessary to meet the NC, that is,
to account for:
(1) the evolutionary path from creatures without language or
thought to creatures with both abilities without postulating
any explanatory and/or evolutionary gap1.
1It was J. Levine the ﬁrst to use the expression in the context of the discus-
sion of reductivist accounts of the mind. He said: “In the end, we are right
back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn’t demonstrate a
gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible
explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there
is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for
doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the for-
mer” (http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Levine.html). Even if Levine was
referring to another aspect of the mind, the point still applies in relation to the
development and evolution of conceptual capacities. The use of the expression
“evolutionary gap” is meant to emphasize the need of having an explanation of
(2) the capabilities of learning or acquiring conceptual contents –
and a natural language – without producing or presupposing
any explanatory and/or evolutionary gap or committing to the
existence of non-natural entities.
And a further constraint:
(3) Answers to (1) and (2) must be able to justify the attributions
of intentional attitudes to children and non-human animals2.
There are two main strategies that have been adopted toward
this challenge. Both of them, when broadly construed, deﬁne two
general models of conceptual abilities that may be described in
terms of the adoption of a ﬁrst-personal perspective or a third-
personal one. The ﬁrst one, that can be called the ﬁrst-personal
model, includes those attempts to understand conceptual abilities
that focus on the individual’s brain states, conceiving them as dis-
positions or informational states that are related in appropriate
ways to the environment such that they can be conceived as con-
stitutive of the competence involving a speciﬁc concept. According
to this model, NC is met because the explanatory work is made by
a naturalistic speciﬁable notion, i.e., one that can be found perva-
sively in the natural sciences, the notion of causation. What makes
a state constitutive of the competence according to a concept is its
being properly caused by that to which the concept refers to or is
about. In this sense, these approaches are causalist accounts of the
nature of conceptual competence.
how certain capacities evolved from others, instead of postulating a gap in nature.
“Explanatory gap” refers to what Levine calls a gap in our understanding, i.e., the
insufﬁciency of a certain set of explanatory tools to infer or otherwise explain
conceptual capacities.
2“Justiﬁcation”in this condition is to be understood in broad terms. Thus, it ismeant
to cover a broad range of explanatory accounts of those attributions, not merely
accounts that will take those attributions to be literally true. There is nevertheless
a minimal constraint that justiﬁcation places in these explanations. It requires that
the explanation of the attributions is based on the abilities displayed in the behavior
of the organism to which the attributions are made.
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The second approach I examine focuses not on the individual
brain states but on the attributive standpoint of an interpreter
that can understand an individual’s behavior conceptually, thus
undertaking a third-personal perspective. This strategy is known
as an interpretationist account of conceptual abilities. NC is met –
so the defenders of this position claim – because this perspective is
not committed to there being any speciﬁc reality of concepts over
and above the interpretational activity of taking the behavior at
issue to be explained in terms of the attribution of the concepts in
question.
My aim in this paper is twofold:
(a) To argue that both causalist and interpretationist accounts of
conceptual abilities are unable to meet NC. The reason for
this failure is that both models are inadequate to account for
mistakes in the application of concepts.
(b) To offer an alternative model – a second-personal interaction-
ist model – that meets NC by accounting in a different way for
the ability to make conceptual mistakes.
CONCEPTUAL ABILITIES: BASIC NOTIONS AND
CONSTRAINTS
There seem to be good reasons to think that no matter how we
deﬁne conceptual abilities nor the position we assume concerning
the scope of conceptual content and its articulation with expe-
rience, being able to apply concepts presupposes as a necessary
condition – though of course not sufﬁcient –being able to dis-
tinguish between correct and incorrect applications of them in
actual cases. This is what we may call the normative constraint on
conceptual abilities3.
Such constraint can be deﬁned as follows:
(1) Tohave conceptual abilities involves as a basic ability being able
to correctly apply concepts, i.e., to distinguish between correct
and incorrect uses of them in given circumstances. This means
that in order to account for the nature of conceptual abilities,
it is necessary to account for the ability to recognize a cor-
rect application of a concept and distinguish it from incorrect
ones.
(2) Conceptual competence does not only involve recognizing an
incorrect use of a concept but also implies to be willing, in
that case, to abandon that use and modify it if necessary,
i.e., to self-correct when noticing an incorrect use of a con-
cept by oneself. This means that in order to account for the
nature of conceptual abilities, it is necessary to account for
self-correction.
Further precisions are required in order to understand correctly
the constraint. As it may be apparent, the normative dimension
involved in the ability to apply concepts involves the possibility of
error.
There are nevertheless twonotions of error ormistake thatmust
be distinguished. In particular, there are two different kinds of
mistakes that we attribute to others in their use of concepts. On the
one hand, we may attribute error to someone when she misapplies
a concept. I call this misapplication or conceptual mistake. On the
3For a full list of necessary conditions for the possession of conceptual abilities, see
Camp (2009) and Scotto (2010).
other, we may attribute lack of competence to a person regarding
a concept when she lacks the concept or is simply not applying
the concept at all. This I what I call absence of application. Such
distinction will prove especially fruitful when assessing whether a
model of conceptual abilities can fulﬁll the normative constraint
accommodating the requirements of NC.
Consider the following cases:
(i) John has been adding correctly and suddenly says
“57 + 124 = 171.”
(ii) John does not know how to reply to a question regarding
the sum of two numbers (he answers randomly, or he simply
shrugs his shoulders).
In the ﬁrst case, we attribute to John that he is adding wrong-
fully, in the second one that he simply is not adding. While (i)
is a case of conceptual mistake, (ii) is just a case of absence of
application. The crucial difference lies in the fact that while in
the former case the concept in question is relevant to the eval-
uation of the action, i.e., is relevant for the way in which the
performance is carried out; in the second case the concept is not
relevant for explaining his performance, it is simply absent4. Fol-
lowing our previous constraints, to account for the normative
constraint speciﬁed in (1) and (2) above, it is necessary to be
able to account for the abilities that underlie the attribution to
a subject that she is committing a mistake in the use of a con-
cept (conceptual mistake), and to distinguish that case from a case
in which the subject is simply not applying the concept (absence
of application), i.e., it is necessary to account for when and how
someone who uses a concept, commits and recognizes conceptual
mistakes and accordingly self corrects her use and to distinguish
that case from one in which the subject is not applying the concept
at all.
How should we then understand self-correction in application
of concepts? Self-correction in the relevant sense seems to involve
three dimensions of performance:
(a) The application of concepts (the actions of applying or
misapplying a concept).
(b) The ability to evaluate (a).
(c) The modiﬁcation of (a) according to the results of (b).
As it will be shown in the following sections, both causalist
and interpretationist accounts of conceptual abilities fail when
accounting for the distinction between cases of misapplication or
conceptual mistakes and cases of absence of application and the
consequence of this failure is their inability to meet NC.
THE CAUSALIST CONCEPTION OF CONCEPTUAL ABILITIES5
The way in which competence regarding a speciﬁc concept X can
be deﬁned in causal terms is the following:
4Of course there are cases like (ii) in which we say that John should have been adding
and ante that there is then an error of performance. But in such cases, what we mean
is that he should have known the concept : the problem resides precisely in the absence
of application of that concept and not a misapplication of it.
5Forbes (1984), Ginet (1992) and Fodor (1998) are some of the advocates of this
approach, although it is much more broadly accepted.
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John is competent with respect to concept X iff given certain
conditions C, John is disposed to apply X to y iff X(y) is true6.
In this framework, conceptual mistakes are modeled in terms
of the failure of a mechanism: conditions C are not given. The
reason for this failure might be internal to the mechanism, that is,
that the mechanism is malfunctioning or it might be the absence
of one of the enabling conditions required for the mechanism to
work.
I claim that when assuming such way of understanding
conceptual competence, there is no non-question-begging way
of distinguishing between conceptual mistakes and absence of
application.
It is important to bear in mind that if John’s mistakes can
be accounted for equally as conceptual mistakes according to
a concept, or as a case of lack of application, there would be
no way to account for the capacity to make conceptual mis-
takes. Say John says “5 + 6 = 12.” We would be immediately
inclined to think he was adding and adding wrong. But he
could equally be performing a different operation, say, +∗,
and doing it correctly. If an account of conceptual capaci-
ties could not distinguish between both cases, it would fail to
explain what is for John to have any conceptual ability and
to distinguish this from the case where this ability is merely
absent.
The causalist model fails to provide a plausible distinction
between conceptual mistakes and absence of application at least
for two reasons:
The ﬁrst reason is that, according to this model, the subject’s
reactions/dispositions to apply concepts can be described in terms
of different concepts. So in this model it is not possible to dis-
tinguish between cases of conceptual mistakes and cases of lack
of application. As Boghossian (1989)7 famously pointed out, the
same reactions can be described using different concepts. This
further requires for the model to distinguish different responses
as appropriate or not in speciﬁc contexts, and in order to identify
the proper set of responses we need to distinguish the good cases
from the bad ones, conceiving these as cases in which conditions
C fail, in the example at issue conditions C would include John
cognitive mechanisms working ﬁne, including normal function-
ing of attention, memory, etc. The problem is that we can only
distinguish the two cases by using the concept we want to recon-
struct, stipulating which is the concept in question, for example,
stipulating that when John says that “6 + 5 = 12,” he is using
the concept of addition. But this means that we have to presup-
pose its content without accounting for it in terms of reactions,
opening an explanatory gap. Importantly, there is no distinction
between absence of application and misapplication that does not
depend on stipulating the concept at issue and thus presupposing
6According to the kind of concept, conditions C will vary. They may for instance
include normality in the subject’s cognitive functions as well proper external condi-
tions, so for example, were the concept a perceptual one, then proper conditions of
illumination will be included as well as the proper functioning of the visual system.
7Kripke (1982) and Wright (1989) have also argued for the same conclusion. The
main claim, as we will see, is that the causalist way of specifying conceptual compe-
tence is circular, in as far as it presupposes the very concept that is supposed to be
specifying by the identiﬁcation of the relevant dispositions. For a discussion of this
see Satne (2005, chapter 3).
the pertinence of that very distinction. It is important to bear in
mind that this problem rises independently of whether the account
takes these processes to occur at the subpersonal level or at the
personal one. In either case, there is no non-question-begging
way of distinguishing that the behavior accords with one concept
and thus is a case of conceptual mistake and not mere absence
of application of that concept8. Thus, the proposal fails to meet
NC9.
The second reason why this view fails to make the distinc-
tion between misapplication and absence of application is that
this account does not give a proper account of self-correction.
According to this kind of theory, the source of error is a failure
in conditions C, but this kind of error is independent of the sub-
jects being able to identify it in practice. The mistakes are of such
a nature that the subject may be unable to identify them (direct
access to them could even be impossible for the subject) and mod-
ify his use of concepts according to the identiﬁcation of error and
its sources.
In fact, conditions C are not conceptually linked to the con-
cepts the subject is applying or trying to learn. But self-correction
seems to be a key ability to account for the process of learning new
conceptual contents through training. Can this theory account for
the connection between the identiﬁcation of mistakes and con-
ceptual abilities that seem constitutive of the process of learning
conceptual contents and linguistic terms associated with them? As
shown before, they cannot. This amounts to a failure to meet NC,
since there is an explanatory/evolutionary gap concerning how
new concepts are learnt and from this perspective the fact that
concept users are able to apply concepts correctly and self-correct
themselves if mistaken seems to be a complete mystery.
However, someone may hold that there are second order dispo-
sitions to evaluate reactions (corresponding to the component (b)
of self-correction described above). The ideawould then be that by
positing them it is possible to account for self-correction and still
defend a purely dispositional account of conceptual competence10.
But a similar problem arises: if those (second-order) disposi-
tions were fallible and learnt, they would require dispositions of
higher order to be learnt. This involves a vicious regress. If, on
the contrary, those dispositions are not fallible and learnt, they
are some kind of sui generis dispositions. This leaves their nature
unexplained: are they to be conceived in causal terms? It seems
that they must not be, in order to avoid the previous difﬁcul-
ties, but then another notion of conceptual ability must do the
work here. This leads to an explanatory gap. Thus, the theory fails
to account for NC (2) since it cannot explain the learning and
acquiring of conceptual contents in a naturalist way (it fails by
8One might think that I am presupposing that self-correction as I deﬁne it is a
personal-level concept and thus unable to challenge subpersonal accounts of con-
ceptual abilities. On the contrary, the deﬁnition is neutral with respect to this. I
thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing this point.
9Fodor (1990a) speciﬁes the concept in question in terms of higher order relations
of asymmetrical dependency between causal relations of this sort. But the problem
reappears in a slightly different form: postulating asymmetrical relations between
causal relations in the absence of a naturalistic explanation of why those relations
should hold merely restates the problem at issue (Hutto, 1999, 2009, pp. 47–48, p.
22; Cummins, 1989).
10Again, the account could sensically hold that this mechanism is to be understood
as operative in a subpersonal level.
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opening an explanatory gap when introducing the sui generis dis-
positions involved in self-correction). And it also fails to account
for NC (1) since its inability to account for self-correction shows
a corresponding failure to draw crucial distinctions between the
capabilities of artifacts and other sorts of entities, some of them
capable of self-correcting in ways that others are not. There is,
according to this model, only one basic kind of mechanism that
explains all of these prima facie different phenomena. But then the
proposal fails in explaining the nature and complexity of different
abilities in terms of more basic or previous ones, and so fails in
drawing the relevant distinctions between abilities and capabilities
of different complexity in a natural and gradual scale11.
THE INTERPRETATIONIST ACCOUNT OF CONCEPTUAL
ABILITIES12
I have presented three dimensions that are involved in self-
correction:
(a) The application of concepts (the actions of applying or
misapplying a concept).
(b) The ability to evaluate (a).
(c) The modiﬁcation of (a) according to the results of (b).
If causalism thinks of level (b) by analogy with (a) and fails to
account for (c), interpretationism stresses level (b).
Brieﬂy sketched, according to this model to be a conceptual
creature is to be a language user. Both notions are accounted for
in terms of interpretation: to be a conceptual creature is to be able
to interpret other creatures’ actions as meaningful. The interpre-
tation of language is just a part of the global task of attributing
meaning to other creatures’ behavior. To interpret someone is to
attribute meaning to their conduct conceiving it as oriented by
wishes and beliefs in the context of a common perceived world.
In sum, to interpret someone is to implicitly construct a theory
about the content of their beliefs, wishes and the like, in the con-
text of a world where both the interpreter and the interpretee are
commonly situated.
The emphasis in this view lies then on component (b), the
evaluation of the actions of a subject according to concepts.
Accordingly, the model deﬁnes conceptual competence as follows:
John is competent with respect to a concept X iff John applies X to
y only when the interpreter would apply X to y, or y is such that the
11Another relevant candidate to account for the normativity of conceptual abilities
is teleosemantics, a model that appeals to the notion of biological function and the
evolutionary history of the organisms to explain representational content. I would
not consider this proposal in detail in this paper. The main reason is that as Fodor
(1990b) has argued, biological function is not sufﬁcient for intensionality: we can
explain the behavior at issue according to one concept or other as long as they
are co-extensional in the relevant de facto situations. In the present context this
would amount to a failure to distinguish between conceptual mistakes according to
a concept and absence of application of that concept. For a detailed treatment of
Teleosemantics and the problems it rises for explaining conceptual content seeHutto
and Satne (2014), where I argue that a story of that sort is part of the explanation
of the relevant capacities but not yet sufﬁcient to account for the normativity of
conceptual content.
12Davidson (1975, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1994, 2001, 2005), Stalnaker (1984), Den-
nett (1991), and Brandom (1994) are some of the main advocates of this approach.
Further speciﬁcations are required that distinguish their positions. I may dispense
of introducing such distinctions here since nothing especially important for the
arguments presented in this section follows from drawing these distinctions.
interpreter would have applied X to it, had his beliefs been slightly
different in a way that matches John’s (assuming that the attribution of
the belief that y is X to John respects principles of rationality, charity,
humanity and causality regarding the interpretation of John’s behavior
as a whole)13.
The attribution of error – in the sense of conceptual mistakes –
is captured as a difference between the perspective of the inter-
preter and the perspective of the interpretee regarding a special
case of application. This may happen in a number of ways. It
might be the case that the subject makes a perceptual judgment
about something that is openly accessible to both the interpreter
and the speaker or it might be that the claim involves a judg-
ment that is not immediately connected to the commonly available
perceptual evidence for both speaker and interpreter. Both cases
are structurally similar according to this theory, even if they are
distinct in terms of the role that each kind of judgment plays
for the interpreter to construct the ongoing understanding of the
speaker’s discourse. While the former constitutes the beginning of
the interpretational process, the latter depends on previous judg-
ments concerning what the speaker is taken to believe, intend and
desire.
The structural similarity resides in that, for the interpreter, to be
able to interpret the speaker’s judgment she would have to assume
that the speaker shares with her a vast optimized majority of true
beliefs. Because of the general theory aboutwhat the speaker is try-
ing to convey at that particular moment, the interpreter can then
attribute local mistakes to what is asserted. The difference between
the two cases is then that in order for the interpreter to make sense
of what is being asserted she would start by attributing to the
speaker that he is related to the same environment that she is and
by that token that he perceives and holds to be true beliefs about
that environment that are the same as those she herself holds. It
is only with speciﬁc evidence to the contrary that the interpreter
will withdraw this particular attribution and then attribute to the
speaker an error of judgment regarding what both are commonly
perceiving. Error will then be explained as a matter of difference
between what the interpreter takes to be the case and what she can
make sense of the speaker trying to convey, taking into account
all the other evidence she has about his beliefs, desires, and the
like. The cost of attributing error to commonly held judgments
is so vast that rationality constraints on the interpretation dictate
to attribute a difference between her perspective and the one of
the speaker regarding some other judgment. This is all left on the
hands of the interpreter who can then make sense of the behav-
ior in different ways, all compatible with the evidence. The rule
is always to attribute the less possible mistake, which is just the
content of the principle of charity that governs interpretation.
This model turns out to be problematic when trying to distin-
guish between conceptual mistakes and absence of application –
and hence to account for conceptual abilities. There are at least
three difﬁculties worth mentioning:
(1) Following the principles of interpretation, the conduct of
the interpretee can be described either way, as a case of
13I will be following mainly Davidson’s presentation of the central traits of the
theory although a similar case, with correspondent adjustments, can be made for
Dennett’s, Stalnaker’s and Brandom’s accounts.
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misapplication of a particular concept or as a case of absence of
application. The concept of error is just a tool for interpreting
another person’s behavior, an attribution that can be canceled
by a better interpretation. Hence, this theoretical reconstruc-
tion does not distinguish between conceptual mistakes and
absence of application.
(2) The theory presupposes the notion of error precisely as a
notion that the interpreter can – and has to – use. To be an
interpreter is to have the concept of belief: to be able to interact
with somebody else is to be able to attribute beliefs to him. The
concept of belief in turns presupposes having the concept of
error, of falsehood. But the theory does not explain how this
concept is gained but rather presupposes the need of such a
tool; and thus produces an explanatory gap in accounting for
the mastery of conceptual abilities. Moreover, the acquisition
of thought, i.e., of the concept of belief, is conceived as emerg-
ing from an evolutionary gap, since the model seems to be
committed to the idea that at some point this ability emerges
but is not clear how it develops from previous more basic ones.
The model then fails to meet both NC (1) and NC (2).
(3) Because of the identiﬁcation between thought, talk and inter-
pretation, the theory cannot account for the ability to entertain
thoughts but not to speak a language (as may be the case with
some non-human animals), or for the possibility to have rudi-
mentary forms of thought and talk (as in the case of young
children), and a fortiori cannot describe those abilities as
forming a continuous path of little steps.
In sum, the model fails to meet NC (2), since it cannot
explain the learning of conceptual abilities as a gradual process.
This implies an explanatory gap regarding the acquisition of lan-
guage, in particular in the acquisition of the concept of error
to be attributed to oneself and others. For these reasons, the
model cannot account either for continuity in nature, i.e., for
the way in which complex abilities of some natural entities emerge
through gradual changes and combinations of more basic capa-
bilities exhibited by other natural entities, and this is a failure to
meet NC (2). And this also means that this kind of theory can-
not explain our attribution of thought to animals and children,
such attributions would be at the most mere “ways of talking14,”
that would not be justiﬁed in terms of the abilities exhibited by
the behavior of such agents, i.e., the theory cannot answer to NC
(3). This leaves unexplained the nature of their capacities and the
connection between their ways in the world and ours.
MY STRATEGY TO MEET NC: CONCEPTUAL MISTAKE AND
STANDARDS OF CORRECTION
The above considerations have shown that both causalist and inter-
pretationist accounts fail when accounting for component (b) of
self-correction, i.e., the ability to evaluate the performance (a).
Thus, in order to overcome their difﬁculties we need to offer an
explanation of level (b) of the self-correction dimensions that (i)
is not reduced to mere causal reactions, as in the case of causal-
ist models. The strategy is to include an evaluative component
that is not conceived in terms of level (a). Second, the account of
(b), must (ii) not presuppose articulated contentful thought, as
14For a proposal exactly along these lines, see Hutto (2008).
is the case of interpretationists account. As in the previous cases,
the account of (b) needs to (iii) have the relevant consequences
for (c).
Before presenting my strategy, there are some distinctions and
precisions that are worth making. The aim to give an account of
conceptual competence seems to be a highly ambitious one and
there are of course a number of different proposals all of which
would deserve to be seriously taken into account when analyz-
ing what the correct answer to NC might be. One issue that is
of particular relevance in this domain is the distinction between
conceptual and non-conceptual content. As it is known,many cur-
rent theories of conceptual competence attempt to address what
I am calling the NC precisely by drawing that distinction. Nev-
ertheless, I neither address this speciﬁc topic in this paper nor I
explore alternative attempts to bridge the gap between the con-
ceptual and non-conceptual domains15. I can dispense of doing
that since what I would be arguing for is neutral to those further
worries. It should be noted that my claim is not that all cognition
should be conceptual but rather that to account for conceptual
abilities while meeting NC, the account needs to meet the norma-
tivity constraint. So my point is the following: no matter where
you draw the line between the conceptual and the non-conceptual,
meeting NC requires giving an account of some sort of basic cog-
nition that cannot be reduced to mere dispositions but that, at the
same time, can be accounted for in terms that do not presuppose
the grasping of propositional ﬁne-grained thoughts.
My proposal is to think of this more basic competence as a nor-
mative one and to model the minimal conceptual ability at issue as
an ability to respond to standards of correct behavior in a way that
sufﬁces to distinguish between cases of absence of application and
cases of misapplications of the standard16. The proposal is then
to describe that behavior as a behavior of responding to speciﬁc
standards of correction (hence being assessable as right or wrong
according to those standards). Such an account must be one that
conceives conceptual abilities in terms of more than mere causal
mechanisms without thus committing to an explanatory gap con-
cerning the emergence of propositional ﬁne-grained articulated
thought.
We can now deﬁne more precisely our question concerning the
possibility of accounting for the normative constraint on concep-
tual abilities accommodating NC in the following terms: what
features must a behavior have in order to count as a conduct
that is sensitive to correctness patterns (unlike a behavior describ-
able in merely dispositional terms) without thereby committing
to it being explained as depending on propositionally articulated
thought, thus leading to an evolutionary and explanatory gap.
Surprising as it might appear as ﬁrst glance, I suggest that the
crucial move to answer this question is to focus our attention into
the kinds of interactions that basic intelligent creatures are able to
deploy. This move is not completely novel in the literature. It was
15For an overview of the main views that endorse non-conceptual content and
discussions thereof, see York (2003).
16Some may think that responding to a speciﬁc standard of correction should not be
classiﬁed as a conceptual behavior, but instead representational, and that we should
reserve the term “conceptual” for propositional articulated thought and behavior.
At this point, this will perhaps be a terminological issue. For a proposal along those
lines, see Schmitz (2012, 2013).
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perhaps Dewey (1929) the ﬁrst to emphasize that second-personal
interaction is key to the learning of language- and this is a tradition
that one can ﬁnd exempliﬁed in the later Wittgenstein as well as
in Davidson’s and Brandom’s writings17. The crucial point to get
clear about though is what kind of interaction we are referring to.
In particular, we need to specify what features of the behavior at
stake, if any (1) display sensitivity to standards of correction and
(2) are both basic and at the same time sophisticated enough to
meet NC.
A ﬁnal further constraint on a proposal of this sort is for
it to accommodate the available empirical evidence concerning
language and concept acquisition. A ﬁrst step could then be to
take a look at the available evidence concerning language acqui-
sition. The empirical study of the way in which such abilities
are learned and deployed may help us identify the nature of the
capacities involved. Furthermore, it is obvious from an empirical
point of view – or at least denying it would be highly implau-
sible – that small children do not have ﬁne-grained articulated
thought from the start, so the study of children’s development
should exhibit the possibility of acquiring the capacity to grasp
propositional articulated thoughts departing from previous non-
propositional capacities that characterize the child’s earlier stages
of development.
I propose that a natural candidate to account for the right kind
of behavior capable of accommodating the normative constraint is
what I call sensitivity to correction, that is the disposition to modify
one’s behavior in the light of salient assessments of others with
whom one is interacting. This claim still needs to gain support
from empirical as well as conceptual grounds and I do try to pro-
vide such support in the remaining sections of this paper. Available
evidence from developmental psychology will also provide some
interesting cases of how this second-personal interaction can be
conceived. Hence, while taking a look at empirical evidence, I
expect to back up both my claim that a middle path between
dispositionalism and interpretationism is in order and that such
middle path is to be thought of in terms of a second-personal kind
of interaction.
EXAMINING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
As I said, one natural place to look for an answer to this question,
framed with NC in mind, is the way children learn concepts.
Csibra and Gergely (2009) have argued that adults–children
interaction is essential to the learning of conceptual content. They
have conducted a number of experiments that suggests that there
is a crucial difference in the subsequent behavior of the infants if
they have learnt merely by observation – when the children are
just observing the behavior of adults – or through being explic-
itly taught – i.e., when there is explicit demonstrative reference
through the use of language to the objects the concepts apply to in
a context in which the child is addressed. What they noted is that
only in the latter case children generalize the result to all similar
cases, while in the former they conceive of the case as contextu-
ally and situationally bound. This provides us a ﬁrst indication
17Wittgenstein (1953), Davidson (1984, 2001), and Brandom (1994). Also Hutto
and Myin (2013).
that interaction plays a crucial role in learning and displaying
conceptual abilities as opposed to other kind of learning, where
no language is involved.
A second indication that the sort of interaction that humans
are capable of might be key to the development of their con-
ceptual abilities comes from primatology. Tomasello (1999) and
Tennie et al. (2010) have claimed that chimpanzees are capable
of emulating behavior but not of abstracting this conduct from
the situational bound contexts in which they ﬁrst perceive it. This
means that while they are capable of imitating the use of tools
in performing a speciﬁc task governed by their own interests and
goals, they do not grasp the general meaning of the object nor
of the end that is displayed in the behavior in a way that can
be detached from the context and the objects they are observing
and using in that speciﬁc occasion. This ﬁts well with Csibra and
Gergely’s (2009) studies suggesting that the interactive aspect of
learning in humans involves a capacity to grasp the general, rule-
like content of linguistic terms and behavior in a way that is not
available to other creatures, and that this speciﬁc learning of gen-
eral meanings takes place through particular training instances in
the context of adult–child interactions, not being possible for chil-
dren isolated from those interactions or for primates other than
human who are not capable of those sorts of interactions (ibid)18.
Furthermore, Tomasello and Racokzy (2003) and Schmidt and
Tomasello (2012) have studied the conduct of children regard-
ing the enforcement of norms, and they observed that at two
years of age children not only asses their behavior according to
norms, accompanying what they do with statements of the sort
“this is what we do” or “This is how it is done,” but also that they
teach others (puppets but also adults that they identify as out-
siders to the community) and that they complain when others do
not conform to what they understand the social norm dictates in
that particular situation. This means that children are ready to
understand normative standards of behavior and to teach them
to others at a very early stage of the development of their con-
ceptual capacities and that they generalize the appropriateness of
what they tend to do to all others with whom they are interacting,
expecting them to act as they do and complaining if they refuse to
do so.
How can this then help us to address NC, considering such
behavior is exhibited by young children but not by other primates?
As I said before, there are a number of philosophical theo-
ries that have focused on the nature of human intersubjective
exchanges to account for our capacity to grasp linguistic mean-
ings. Haugeland (1990) and Brandom (1994) for example, have
suggested that it is our attitude of treating a performance as right
or wrong in particular contexts what makes that conduct right
18Csibra and Gergely (2009) have called this speciﬁc aspect of the way human
beings teach and learn from each other “natural pedagogy.” Tomasello (1999, 2014)
argues that primates are incapable of engaging in joint action with other primates
or humans because they lack the ability to form intentions about other individuals
intentions. Here I am not committing to the particular explanation Csibra and
Gergely (2009) give of the abilities in which this sort of interactions are based, nor to
Tomasello’s explanation, in both cases highly sophisticated Theory of Mind abilities
seem to be required. Regardless of their explanations, the evidence points toward a
key role for interaction in the ability to learn and apply conceptual contents. With
the idea of meeting NC, I provide a different and less demanding understanding of
what is at issue in interaction that accounts for these differences.
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or wrong, and that this is a socially structured practice, in which
we treat each other as committed and entitled or not to further
actions as if we were playing a social game, the rules of which
get speciﬁed by us treating the different moves as appropriate or
not. Wittgenstein (1953) has also been read as defending a view
according to which language should be thought of as a cluster of
games that we play together and that it is internal to those games
that certain moves are allowed or forbidden. The moves would
then be correct or incorrect according to the game in the con-
text of which they are assessed. Nevertheless, these theories are
problematic if, as in Brandom’s theory, the moves of the game are
thought to be propositionally articulated or if they imply interpre-
tational stances on the part of the participants, as interpretationist
accounts do. As I have argued before, such positions, if taken to be
the whole story, turn out to be unable to meet NC. So I suggest that
the right place to look at for is not the domain of interpretational
theory but rather a different kind of interactionism, in particular
interactionist phenomenologically based theories19.
Such theories start from one basic insight about the nature of
social cognition: the fact that we are able to understand directly
and correctly emotions on the face of others and their behavior
as intentional and goal-oriented from the very ﬁrst experiences of
encountering others. This has been called“primary intersubjectiv-
ity.” It involves a kind of recognition of others that is displayed by
newborns and that is characterized precisely by neither involving
any kind of inferential cognitive mechanisms nor any mediation
through articulated thoughts, such as attributing states to others.
That notwithstanding, it involves more than just mere reactions
to stimuli. More precisely, it involves grasping the meaning of the
other person’s reactions. As Scheler famously described it: “that
experiences occur there [in the other person] is given for us in
expressive phenomena – [. . .] not by inference, but directly, as a
sort of primary “perception.” It is in the blush that we perceive
shame, in the laughter joy” (Scheler, 1954, p. 10).
Phenomenology then provides us with a different route to
understand the empirical ﬁndings of developmental psychology
on the nature of normative behavior. It allows us to understand in
what sense we are able to grasp the rightness or wrongness of what
we are doing without committing us to think of this in a propo-
sitionally loaded way. According to these theories, based both in
early development psychological studies and a phenomenologi-
cally based explanation of them, there is, from the very beginning
of our lives, a way of tuning the other person’s emotions and it
is that tuning, we might think, what ﬁrst teaches us about the
distinction between right and wrong, good or bad, this way or
not-this-way.
Having taken a brief look at some recent works on Phe-
nomenology and Developmental Psychology, we have found
concurring support for the need to abandon the third-person
perspective characteristic of interpretationism, but also the con-
ﬁnement within the ﬁrst person perspective, characteristic of
causalism. Such works suggest the convenience of prioritizing
19Trevarthen (1978, 1979), Hobson (2002), Reddy (2008), and Rochat (2012) have
defended and developed this theory from a psychological point of view. Gallagher
(2001, 2004, 2007), Gallagher and Hutto (2008) and Gallagher and Zahavi (2008)
have provided reasons in favor of if from the philosophical one.
interlocutors’ interactions in face-to-face encounters in which the
emotional recognition of the emotions of others might play a key
role in our entry to language. It is in this domain, I argue, that
we ﬁnd the kind of behavior that allows distinguishing between
conceptual mistakes and absence of application in a way that does
not imply yet the reﬂective and explicit grasping of the standard to
which we are nevertheless responding. In particular, I argue that
it is our emotional response to approval and disapproval attitudes
expressed in the interlocutors emotional behavior what allows us
to learn from others language and criteria of correct use for words
in contexts of use. Thus, this responsive behavior constitutes a
kind of minimal conceptual competence vis-à-vis naturalist and
normative constraints. How this allows us to accommodate the
normative constraint answering at the same time to NC will be the
topic of the next and ﬁnal section.
INTERACTION AND SENSITIVITY TO CORRECTION
As I have claimed, if the problems of interpretationism and
causalism are taken seriously what we need to ﬁnd is a form of
behavior that is not reduced to causal reactions but does not
presuppose the ability to entertain articulated thoughts. Further-
more, I have shown that taking into consideration the evidence
from developmental psychology regarding the learning of lan-
guage and norms, the right kind of behavior seems to be essentially
interactive.
Advocators of the phenomenologically based interactionist the-
ory usually draw a distinction between two different kinds of
intersubjectivity that characterize capacities that are displayed at
different stages in the child’s development. First, primary inter-
subjectivity (to be found from birth) is constituted by the ability
to recognize emotions and reactions in other person’s faces with-
out the use of any theoretical tool in face-to-face encounters. It
is a capability that is primary, not acquired, but innate. The con-
duct of others is recognized as intentional, as directed toward
an end. It involves temporal, auditive, and visual coordination
with someone else with whom the baby is interacting. It is not
substituted by other types of interaction but coexists with them,
as a precondition for other abilities and as a complement of
them. Later on20, children engage in secondary intersubjectiv-
ity, a kind of interaction that is characterized by the ability to
identify objects and events in pragmatically meaningful contexts
by shared attention mechanisms (based on the abilities gained
through engaging in the previous kind of intersubjectivity). In
this stage, children refer to the adults gaze when the meaning
of an object is ambiguous or unclear. It is in the context of
this kind of engagement with others that children learn a nat-
ural language by being taught and exposed to it in all sort of
interactions21.
20There is some debate about when exactly this happens among advocates of the
interactionist theory, ranging from 6 to 18 months of age depending on the author.
21Gallagher and Hutto (2008) have claimed that narratives play a crucial role in
the way in which children learn different perspectives and build a conception of
themselves and of others that is enriched vis-à-vis the primary and emotional sort
of engagement characteristic of the initial encounters with others. Even if this may
be so, a previous question to be made, following our previous considerations, is
how is it that children learn to respond to concepts as standards to assess their own
conduct.
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My suggestion is that the right place to look for the ability
of self-correction is in the context of the capability of engaging
in primary intersubjectivity22. It is in that domain that children
display a disposition to respond to others, characterized by an
attunement to their expectations and an ability to shape their
behavior as a way of responding and satisfying the demands of
others, paying special attention to the kind of response that their
behavior elicits in the adult. This kind of exchanges is possible
through common engagements in face-to-face encounters where
the emotions of both are directly perceptible for each other. The
common contexts in which those interactions take place include
objects and their properties, which, as the interaction evolves
and the answers become more stable, begin to be understood
as independent standing qualities and objects. Throughout this
process, joint attention mechanisms among other capacities come
into stage and help to develop an early stage conceptual under-
standing and a primitive form of using concepts that will later
became much more sophisticated, gaining independence from
particular assessments and responses. Nevertheless, they will
never lose their connection with actual uses and assessments of
others.
How can we then distinguish between conceptual mistakes
and absence of application in this early stage of development?
In the previous section, I have examined some relevant work in
developmental psychology on the nature of normative behavior
and learning. Those studies suggest that interactions are key in
that they elicit and display normatively informed behavior that is
exhibited in the way in which children respond to adults in learn-
ing through two basic attitudes: generalizing (what they take to
be correct) and enforcing on others the norm (actively correcting
each other, showing that they are not only passively responding
to the environment but spontaneously conceiving of what they
are doing as an standard of correction to which themselves and
all others are supposed to conform). Accordingly, in the context of
the kind of interaction just described, I suggest there is a speciﬁc
ability that constitutes a better candidate than mere reactions or
articulated thought to meet NC. I call such ability sensitivity to
correction. It can be deﬁned as the disposition to modify one’s
own behavior regarding the application of a speciﬁc concept in
the light of the consent and dissent of others with whom one is
interacting in face-to-face encounters. Sensitivity to correction so
deﬁned is precisely the feature of human behavior that allows us
to accommodate the normativity constraint without abandoning
the naturalistic conditions of adequacy that constitute NC.
When characterizing the different levels involved in self-
correction (a pervasive feature of normative behavior), I men-
tioned: (a) the application of concepts (the actions of applying or
misapplying a concept), (b) The ability to evaluate (a) and (c) the
modiﬁcation of (a) according to the results of (b). Both causal-
ist and interpretationist account of conceptual capacities fail to
provide a consistent answer to account for the difference between
conceptual mistake and absence of application overemphasizing
22Varga and Gallagher (2012) have claimed that the notion of recognition, as an
interpersonal demand, that occupies a central role in the discussions of moral
normativity, should be traced back to its primary location in this ﬁrst strongly
psychologically based kind of interaction with others. I am claiming that this
recognitional competence plays a role in conceptual normativity as well.
one of the elements, (a) as a model for (b) in the case of causalism,
(b) as the all-encompassing interpreter’s perspective in the case
of interpretationism. My proposal, on the contrary, is to think of
level (b) as constituted by sensitivity to correction, that is the ability
to correct and monitor our own action in the light of the reactions
of others toward those very actions23. In this case (a) corresponds
to a kind of behavior that displays intentionality, being directed
toward an object to which the behavior is responding and (b) cor-
responds to the dimension in which we self-monitor our reaction
to the object by tuning it to the way other reacts to us and our
directed behavior. Sensitivity to correction is a social disposition,
that is, a disposition to tune our behavior to the assessments and
normative feedbacks we get from others in particular interactions.
It is then an evaluative attitude that involves the perceiving and
attunement to the approval or disapproval from others. Finally,
corresponding to (c), the way in which we apply concepts is of
course modiﬁed through the assessments involved in (b): actually,
we may say, assessing our conduct amounts – at least in the most
early stages of the acquisition of language and conceptual abili-
ties – to modifying it according to the approval or disapproval of
others.
We may now characterize the difference between conceptual
mistakes and absence of application given the framework I have
just presented. This distinction will take different shapes along the
different stages involved in learning and grasping concepts. It will
ﬁrst consist in the ability to correct ourselves by tuning the other
person’s assessments (monitoring myself through you, trying to
make my own the perspective of the other with whom the inter-
action is taking place). It is a self-monitoring mechanism based
upon the convergence of joint attention mechanisms that iden-
tify what is salient in the context and of the other’s monitoring of
my own performance; the individual monitors her conduct taking
into account both what she is directed to (level a) and assessing it
in accordance to the assessment of others (level b), by then mod-
ifying the behavior accordingly (level c). It is precisely through
responding to the other’s gaze and his attitudes of approval or dis-
approval that a criteria for the application of a concept in practice
can be thought to be in place, as a standard of correction, hence
distinguishing the case at stake from one in which the concept is
not relevant at all, a case of absence of application. The concept in
question would be poor in content at this point and its boundaries
blurry. Thus conceptual competence at this stage is understood
as a minimum conceptual understanding: but that minimum is
exhibited precisely by the fact that the behavior is sensitive to a
distinction between right and wrong ways of acting according to
speciﬁc standards of correction (concepts), and this in turn is
equivalent to there being a right way of acting in the world that
the other and I share. Sensitivity to correction is, we may say, the
phenomenological exhibition of the normativity of concepts. We
23According to this view, what is directly perceived are emotions, associated with
positive and negative reactions toward other’s behaviorwhen conceiving it correct or
incorrect. So by extension, understanding such assessment can be thought as based
on the ability to perceive these positive and negative emotions and tune to them by
changing one’s behavior accordingly. The intentional directed behavior of the adults
or peers, that is also perceived, will also play a key role in understanding what kind
of performance is expected. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for
pressing this point.
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can thus distinguish conceptual mistakes from cases of absence
of application in that the subject is responding to the assessment
of his behavior by modifying it accordingly as will not be the
case if it were a case of absence of application. So, what makes
the crucial difference is sensitivity to correction, a sensitivity that
is displayed in actual interactions. Now, as learning progresses,
self-correction gains independence from the presence of actual
assessors. And then the subject self-corrects herself according to
different actual or imagined scenarios and perspectives that she
can reenact. Sociability is still a pervasive and crucial element of
self-correcting behavior but is now exhibited as the very idea that
I can be wrong according to different standards (which equates to
the idea that there are other perspectives)24.
Finally, it is time to consider whether the tools just introduced
are capable of properly meeting NC when accounting for the nor-
mative dimension involved in concept use. I cannot provide in
this paper a detailed and all-encompassing answer to NC but, as
it will be shown next, this proposal can give a proper general
strategy to meet NC. This general strategy consists in identifying
sensitivity to correction as the middle step between mere causal
responses to the environment and contentful propositional atti-
tudes. While the latter imply complete independence, ﬂexibility,
detachability, and general inferential articulation; the former, on
the contrary, only amounts to nomological covariances between
states and objects thatmay fail given an opennumber of contextual
variations. The important point is that between these two ends of
the invisible line of development and evolution there are as well
different intermediate stages.
Following this strategy, we can then give a general outline of
the evolutionary path from creatures without language or thought
to creatures with both abilities. In a ﬁrst very elemental level there
may only be reactions to stimuli, being error just a failure in causal
mechanisms. The true normative dimension emerges precisely
when sensitivity to correction enters into stage, displaying the abil-
ity to interact with others (same species, interspecies) in a primary
interaction sort of exchange. This hypothesis is supported from
the fact, underlined by many evolutionary theories (Tomasello,
1999, 2014; Tomasello and Racokzy, 2003), that the main evolu-
tionary step that distinguishes humans from other species is the
ability to engage in social interactions of a highly sophisticated
nature. Accordingly, in this stage subjects are capable of apply-
ing concepts independently of stimuli and are capable of applying
the same concept to different objects and different concepts to the
sameobject25, ultimately gaining the capacity to associate language
items with meanings (norms of use of sounds and marks). Thus,
the well-acknowledged idea of sociality as the trait characteristic
24It is important noticing that contrary to Hutto’s (1999) and Davidson’s (2001)
view the idea is not that perceiving other perspectives as such gives a normative
dimension to what I am doing, but that ﬁrst I attune my behavior to what others
expect from me and only latter the difference of perspectives can became salient
and object of my own reﬂection. This last possibility is only present when there is
also the capability of grasping explicitly the standards that this other perspectives
represent and how they stand to the behavior being assessed.
25This is the satisfaction of a simpliﬁed version of the Generality Constraint (see
Camp, 2009). All these abilities together amount to the acquiring of minimal con-
ceptual capacities (for conditions onminimal conceptuality, see Camp, 2009; Scotto,
2010).
of the emergence of the human26, when understood in terms
of sensitivity to correction, can also explain the emergence of
normative behaviors without any explanatory gap. The possibility
of interpreting others and ourselves explicitly as following or fail-
ing to follow certain norms or rules, an ability that involves already
propositionally articulated thoughts, is to be gained by engaging
in earlier forms of sociality27.
A similar point can be made regarding the question of onto-
genesis, where practical engagements with others in face-to-face
encounters (primary intersubjectivity) that display a primitive
form of sensitivity to correction progressively lead to secondary
intersubjectivity, as a form of interaction involving shared atten-
tion mechanisms, monitoring and correcting, in the context of
which language is learned. Learning is a process in which the
child eventually gets to be a competent user. At the beginning she
may need guidance and mainly self-correct when assessed neg-
atively but later on, she will try herself to repeat this correcting
behavior thus generalizing what is learnt and gaining autonomy
in self-assessing her own behavior. Once again, the third-personal
interpretative stance can only get into the picture much later
once the full inferential capacity and the capability of complex
interpretation processes are in place.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have claimed that two of the most popular theories that account
for conceptual competence fail when considered against the back-
ground of both the NC, i.e., the challenge of accounting for
both the ontogeny and phylogeny of conceptual thought without
explanatory or evolutionary gaps, and the normative constraint,
i.e., the distinction between conduct that is guided by an standard
of correction and the conduct that can only be externally assessed
as responding to concepts.
Following some insights from developmental psychology and
phenomenology, I have presented an alternative framework, inter-
actionist theory, in the context of which the normativity constraint
is accommodated in the domain of actual interactions with others
in the learning of language and concepts. My central claim was
that sensitivity to correction is a social, evaluative disposition that
tunes us to other people’s assessments of our behavior in actual
interactions and allows us to learn from them standards of cor-
rection for our actions. This kind of disposition is what makes the
difference evolutionarily and in terms of individual development.
The fact that human sociality is themain difference betweenus and
other species is pervasively accepted and has independent grounds
in evolutionary studies. If we can make sense of the connection
between conceptual informed behavior and social behavior, as we
26See Sterelny (2012) and Tomasello (2014).
27I am making a distinction between three paradigmatic and different abilities: (i)
causal responses to the environment; (ii) sensitivity to correction in interaction; (iii)
entertaining of propositionally articulated thoughts. This distinction is schematic
and it is meant to distinguish important milestones in development and evolution.
But this threefold classiﬁcation should not be taken to characterize one stage in
development as opposed to others. On the contrary, those abilities appear in Inter-
actionist Theory only as paradigmatic of some stages that give rise to the others
(and multiple other intermediate ones in between) by ways of progressive complex-
ity. Accordingly, each stage in evolution and development integrates in different
manners previous stages not by replacing them but by complementing them with
new abilities.
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have proposed we can, then this gives indirect support to the idea
that this might be the crucial step in the evolutionary story of the
human species. As for the case of human learning, I argued that
recent studies in developmental psychology suggest that it is pre-
cisely our ways of engaging with others and understanding them
what underlies our capacity to learn from each other the kind of
general and abstract meanings that we then deploy in our social
lives. The so often underlined social character of human life may
ﬁnd in the idea of sensitivity to correction a further speciﬁcation
capable of illuminating the way in which language and thought
emerge.
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